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Abstract: Milton Friedman (1962) is known for the claim that political freedom presupposes 
economic freedom (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). Friedman's famous example is that there cannot 
be freedom of speech where the government owns the printing presses. Less well-known is F. A. 
Hayek's and John Jewkes's illustrations of the same principle, both drawing from labor 
economics. Absent a freely operating price system, economic planning cannot function without 
resorting to compulsory assignment of labor. Similarly, no state may simultaneously fix “fair” 
wages and demand a given pattern of productive output and employment. It is impossible to both 
achieve income equality and accomplish an economic plan. This counters Farrant and McPhail 
(2009)'s claim that Hayek was incorrect in applying his thesis to the modern welfare state. Labor 
economics helps demonstrate why democratic socialism is impossible, in the sense that it cannot 
accomplish what its advocates desire.
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F. A. Hayek is sometimes criticized for neglecting the contributions of Public Choice. 
Peter J. Boettke (1995) replies that Hayek's (2007 [1944]) Road to Serfdom anticipated at least 
three basic teachings of Public Choice:1 first, the logic of collective action which enables special 
interests to obtain privileges. Second, that political behavior is conditioned by the institutional 
constraints and incentives of the office (“why the worst get on top”). Third, Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem (cf. Boettke and Leeson 2002, Makovi 2016b). In addition, Boettke 
discerns in in Hayek a fourth discovery, viz. the impossibility of distinguishing between political 
and economic freedom.
The argument that economic freedom presupposes political freedom is most famously 
associated with Milton Friedman who said (1962:7), “the advocacy of 'democratic socialism' 
[rests on the belief that] . . . politics and economics are separate and largely unconnected . . . and 
that any kind of political arrangements can be combined with any kind of economic 
arrangements.”2 For example, Friedman famously points out (1962:16-18), the freedom of 
speech is difficult to maintain when the government owns all the printing presses and meeting 
houses (cf. Rothbard 1977:26, Mises 1981 [1922]:38).3 Even were the government to decide to 
subsidize subversive dissent – as e.g. Michael Harrington advocates (1978a:443, 1978b:357; cf. 
Lavoie 1985a:139) – the government would have to decide whose dissent was legitimate and 
worthy of subsidy. The government could not subsidize all dissent for then countless individuals 
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would choose to become professional dissenters, and the quantity of dissent supplied would 
approach infinity (Friedman 1962:18). But if the government can only afford to subsidize some 
dissent and not others, and if there no private source of credit or funding for dissenters, then the 
democratic socialist government has an absolute power to decide whose dissent will be given a 
platform. Even a benevolent and altruistic socialist government cannot abdicate this necessarily 
totalitarian exercise of power. The democratic socialist government must necessarily declare that 
some dissent is illegitimate, creating the same problem of totalitarianism which democratic 
socialism was meant to avoid in the first place.4
Less well-known, however, is Hayek's use of labor economics to prove the same point 
which Friedman illustrated using the freedom of speech. This essay explores Hayek's little-
known use of labor economics to illustrate how political and economic freedom cannot be 
distinguished. Furthermore, we shall see that a lesser-known economist, John Jewkes (1968 
[1948]), also used labor economics in the same way as Hayek did.5
Using Hayek's and Jewkes's example of labor economics, this essay will demonstrate that 
democratic socialism is “impossible” in the sense that it can never successfully accomplish the 
goals of its advocates.6 Democratic political institutions are fundamentally incompatible with 
economic socialism. This essay shall utilize labor economics to prove that democratic socialism 
is politically impossible, not that it is economically unfeasible. Even if it were possible to 
implement an economically rational form of socialism, its political institutions could not be 
democratic; nor could it promise to safeguard individual rights and liberties against government 
abuse.7
But before we can examine Hayekian labor economics in particular, we must first 
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evaluate whether Hayek's argument of the inseparability of political and economic freedom was 
more or less generally valid. Therefore, the essay proceeds as follows: section I defends Hayek 
against recent criticisms of his general thesis of the inseparability of freedoms. Then section II 
examines Hayek's specific example of labor economics. Section III uses the conclusions of 
section II to complete the work of section I, showing how Hayek's analysis of labor economics 
applies to the welfare state as well, contrary to critics who argued that Hayek was wrong to 
believe that the thesis of The Road to Serfdom applies to the welfare state.
I. THE ROAD TO SERFDOM RECONSIDERED
Today's welfare states have apparently not led us down the road to serfdom, and this may 
be considered a refutation of Hayek's claim that political and economic freedom cannot be 
distinguished (Farrant and McPhail 2009).8 But what Hayek (and Jewkes) especially criticized is 
not redistribution of income by high levels of personal income taxation, but command-and-
control regulation and government ownership of the means of production. Inspired by the de 
facto nationalization-by-regulation of the National Socialist regime in Germany, Hayek's Road to 
Serfdom (2007 [1944]) criticized the British Labour Party's policy of nationalization.9 Hayek was 
not primarily concerned with high levels of personal income taxation and redistribution such as 
we might find in Sweden. Therefore, Bruce Caldwell states (Hayek 2007 [1944]:30f.), “[T]he 
existence of such states [i.e. welfare states], and whatever successes they may or may not have 
had, does not undermine Hayek’s logical argument from The Road to Serfdom: a welfare state is 
not socialism.” According to Caldwell (2011), The Road to Serfdom's argument against central 
planning must be distinguished from Hayek's milder criticism of the welfare state in The 
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Constitution of Liberty (2011 [1960]) and in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1977). The Road to 
Serfdom must be understood in its specific historical and institutional context (Caldwell 2011, 
1997:1866-1871) and it must not be confused with Hayek's later works, which are more relevant 
to the political situation today. This essay will expand on Caldwell's distinction.
The reason why the welfare state does not take us down the same road to serfdom as the 
command-and-control state, is because taxation and redistribution of income do not interfere 
with the operation of the price system the way command-and-control does (Ikeda 2015:409, 
414). As Wilhelm Röpke (1992 [1942]:260; cf. 1987 [1951]:7f.) said,
we find that a differentiation between two groups of state intervention is of 
foremost importance, for which we have suggested the terms “compatible” and 
“incompatible” interventions: i.e. those that are in harmony with an economic 
structure based on the market, and those which are not. Interventions which do 
not interfere with the price mechanism and with the automatism of the market 
derived from it are compatible, they let themselves be absorbed as new “data”; 
interventions which paralyse the price mechanism and therefore force us to 
replace it by a planned (collectivist) order, we call incompatible. 
This emphasis on the operation of the price system is crucial. Farrant and McPhail (2009:10n17), 
arguing against Hayek's thesis, briefly remark that Hayek approvingly cites Ludwig von Mises’s 
Kritik des Interventionismus (Mises 1996 [1929]; cf. Mises 1998).10 But Farrant and McPhail 
(2009) do not explore the deeper significance of Hayek's citation of Mises. That work by Mises 
(1996 [1929]; cf. Mises 1998) was written specifically regarding price-controls, arguing that 
interventions which controlled prices – setting floors and ceilings – would lead to shortages and 
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surpluses which would tend to motivate additional interventions to fix the problems caused by 
price-controls. Mises argued that one price-control led to another until every price in the entire 
economy was controlled or supplanted by command-and-control, resulting in de facto socialism 
(cf. Mises 1974 [1950]). But Mises's argument does not apply to taxes and subsidies which 
preserve the operation of the price-system. Significantly, in an essay predominately discussing 
how price-controls lead to socialism, Mises briefly criticizes progressive taxation, and his 
argument is not that progressive taxation leads to socialism or totalitarianism, but only that 
progressive taxation reduces savings and investment and leads to capital decumulation (Mises 
1974 [1950]:32; cf. Mises 1981 [1922]:237). Obviously, Mises considered price-controls and 
progressive taxation to lead to quite different outcomes, and it is fair to hypothesize that Hayek 
likely thought similarly.
Not all government interventions in the economy are equally likely to lead us along the 
road to serfdom. Taxation and subsidy of individual income produces different effects than 
regulation and taxation of specific activities. Similarly, school vouchers are distinct from the 
public operation of schools because the one is more compatible with competition and the price-
system than the other (Friedman 1962:108-118). While Hayek rejected the modern mixed 
economy, he approved of the institution of a minimum social safety net (1977:87), and he 
endorsed Friedman's negative income tax (Ebeling 1977:12). Presumably this was because 
providing a cash subsidy to all those whose incomes were less than a certain amount, regardless 
of how those incomes were obtained and regardless of how that cash is spent, is less totalitarian 
than variously taxing and subsidizing a myriad of specific activities.
Therefore, Sweden does not refute Hayek (pace Samuelson in Farrant and McPhail 
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2009:5, 9, 11, 12). The Scandinavian system has historically relied more on redistribution of 
income than regulation or nationalization, and it includes a high degree of protection of private 
property and freedom to internationally trade (Stein 1991, Sanandaji 2011, Tupy 2016, Mitchell 
2016). To a large degree, what Scandinavian “socialism” (sic) has entailed is giving some 
individuals a cash subsidy and then allowing them free reign to spend this cash however they 
desire in a free market. In many ways, Sweden is more pro-market than the United States. This is 
not socialism. Fittingly, Lawson and Clark (2010:235) note that according to their empirical 
analysis,
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis [that economic liberty is a necessary 
precondition for political liberty] is confirmed most strongly when looking at the 
legal structure and property rights and the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic 
Freedom of the World] index. These two areas are more closely identified with 
political and civil liberties than the other areas of the EFW index (fiscal size of 
government, monetary policy, and trade policy).
Hence, by “socialism” I mean nationalization, central planning, and/or command-and-control 
regulation, in contrast to the Scandinavian system.11 This is what socialists themselves have 
historically intended. Fundamentally, what socialism means is the abolition or restriction of the 
price system. If anything, Scandinavian “socialism” has vindicated Hayek by eschewing 
precisely what Hayek warned against. 
Now in fact, we have overstated the case, and we must admit this strict dichotomy 
between taxation and command-and-control is not entirely clear. A tax is a command-and-control 
except that a given action is punished by confiscating money instead of by imprisoning the 
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offender. Put differently, both taxation and criminalization work by altering incentives, except 
that the one imposes a much stronger disincentive than the other. Both tobacco taxes and 
marijuana criminalization disincentive the use of these respective drugs and so they are forms of 
command-and-control. In fact, most regulations resemble taxes insofar as they are generally 
enforced through monetary fines, not criminal imprisonment. Thus, taxes are a form of 
command-and-control, and Mises (1981 [1922]:230; cf. ibid. 447) is therefore able to speak of 
one particular socialist scheme as follows:
Directly or indirectly through its taxation policy, it [the socialist state] determines 
the conditions of labour, moves capital and labour from one branch of industry to 
another . . . These tasks falling to the State are the only important ones and they 
constitute the essence of economic control.
Nevertheless, the distinction between taxation and command-and-control is still important. Not 
all taxes are equally command-like, for it depends on what sort of disincentive is created. There 
is no such thing as a perfectly neutral tax, but some taxes are more neutral than others. For 
example, a flat per-capita tax is more neutral than an income tax. A person is taxed a fixed 
number of dollars simply for being alive. Such a flat, per-capita tax would not encourage or 
discourage any specific behaviors, and so it would not be very command-like, although it would 
still affect a person's choice of trade-off between labor and leisure trade-off due to the income 
and substitution effects. It is difficult to translate a flat per-capita tax into a command of the form 
“thou shalt” do anything in particular. But a fixed-percentage income tax affects incentives more 
than a per-capita tax, and so it is more command-like. A progressive income tax is still more 
command-like. This series of taxes becomes progressively less neutral and more command-like. 
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Eventually we reach the realm of taxes on highly specific activities and products, such as tobacco 
taxes or taxes on particular sources of income irrespective of their magnitudes. These are 
extremely command-like. 
In other words, some taxes and regulations are more general or particular than others, 
violating the  rule-of-law differently. For Hayek (2007 [1944]:112-123), the rule-of-law entails 
general, abstract, purpose-independent rules which apply to everyone equally, in contrast to rules 
which apply specifically to different people and different activities. People should be treated 
impartially and the laws should provide a general framework within which people can plan their 
own lives. But planning by command necessarily requires singling some kinds of people or some 
kinds of activities to be treated radically different than others. People's lives must be planned for 
them, and the government's plans may radically change from one moment to the next according 
to expediency. Therefore, the distinction between taxation and command-and-control regulation 
should be understood as a continuum, with some taxes being more or less command-like, 
depending on the degree to which they compel people to make certain decisions in their private 
lives. Indeed, Hayek (1966:175) criticized specifically progressive income taxation for being 
discriminatory and therefore violating the rule-of-law.
Furthermore, there is the crucial question whether actors are permitted to freely adjust 
their behavior to the tax regime, or whether the state demands behaviors which run counter to the 
incentives created by the taxes – in other words, whether the state requires its subjects to behave 
as if taxed products and activities are not taxed at all. In a free-market, “taxation . . . imposes 
certain obstacles in individual businesses, but leaves the market to deal with its effect upon the 
prices of commodities and wages, on profits, interest, and rents” (Mises 1981 [1922]:446). A tax 
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on a commodity may essentially command the subject to consume less of that commodity, but at 
least the subject is free to decide how much or little to alter their consumption. The individual's 
freedom in this regard provides a outlet to moderate the coerciveness of the tax. But suppose the 
state were to tax the incomes of those employed in a given industry and yet insist that the level of 
employment in that industry remain the same as it was prior to the imposition of the tax. 
Taxation, combined with such a command to behave as if that taxation does not exist, is more 
coercive than taxation alone. Hence, it is important while reading Hayek to keep in mind Röpke's 
(1992 [1942]:260; cf. 1987 [1951]:7f.) distinction between “compatible” interventions which 
preserve the price-system and “incompatible” interventions which do not (cf. Ikeda 2015:409, 
414).12
Therefore, Hayek's argument is an institutionally contingent one, and whether a given tax 
or regulation will lead us down the road to serfdom depends on precisely whether and how that 
tax or regulation will force people to live their lives differently than they otherwise would have, 
and also how compatible a given intervention is with the functioning of the price system – 
meaning, whether consumption, production, and employment are free to adjust themselves to 
whatever prices turn out to be, or whether the government demands a given pattern of 
consumption, production, and employment regardless of whatever prices turn out to be. Hayek's 
argument in the Road to Serfdom should be understood to apply to command-and-control 
regulations and to taxes which are substantially command-like, violating the generality and non-
discrimination of the rule-of-law. As we shall see, Hayek thought that the welfare state would 
adopt labor regulations which interfered with the operation of the price system and denied the 
rule-of-law. While Hayek may not have predicted the future accurately, this does not negate the 
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prescience of his warning against particular interventions which the government happily turned 
out to eschew. Hayek's warning is not less valuable simply because it was heeded.
II. HAYEK AND JEWKES ON THE ALLOCATION OF LABOR UNDER SOCIALISM
1. Labor Economics according to Hayek and Jewkes
All planning is necessarily coercive; it is impossible to plan the economy without 
planning individual people's lives. Planning means making people's life decisions for them. As 
Hayek notes, many of the planners have failed to realize this fact. “The consolation our planners 
offer us is that this authoritarian direction will apply 'only' to economic matters” (2007 
[1944]:124). But this reply is based on “the erroneous belief that there are purely economic ends 
separate from the other ends of life” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:125; cf. Boettke 1995:11). Economics 
is simply the science of choosing those means which are most satisfactory for accomplishing 
given ends. In this sense, every aspect of life is economic in nature (Mises 1981 [1922]:107) . As 
physical beings, humans cannot accomplish any ends without the use of material means. For 
example, it is impossible to learn and obtain knowledge without access to physical books or 
classrooms. For government to plan the production of books and classrooms is to plan the terms 
and conditions on which people will be able to obtain knowledge. Therefore, Hayek (2007 
[1944]:126) states, economic planning raises the question of “whether it shall be we who decide 
what is more, and what is less, important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planners.” 
“The authority directing all economic activity . . . would control the allocation of the limited 
means for all our ends” (2007 [1944]:126). “Economic control is not merely control of a sector 
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of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends” 
(2007 [1944]:127).13
Marx said that “in place of the government over persons comes the administration of 
things,” to which Mises (1981 [1922]:73) replied, “there can be no administration of goods 
which is not administration of men – i.e. the bending of one human will to another – and no 
direction of productive processes which is not the government over persons – i.e. domination of 
one human will by another.” Furthermore, Mises said (1981 [1922]:493),
Whatever people do in the market economy, is the execution of their own plans. 
In this sense every human action means planning. What those calling themselves 
planners advocate is not the substitution of planned action for letting things go. It 
is the substitution of the planner's own plan for the plans of his fellow men.
Friedman (1962) agreed that political freedom presupposes economic freedom, showing 
that there cannot be freedom of speech where the government owns the printing presses. But 
Hayek and Jewkes instead used labor economics to illustrate the same principle. Planning, they 
said, demands the coercive regimentation of labor, precluding freedom of occupation and even 
the choice where to live. As Hayek (2007 [1944]:129) states, “If they want to plan, they must 
control the entry into the different trades and occupations.” This is due to the problem of 
economically allocating labor efficiently absent the price-system. In a market economy, labor is 
allocated through differential wages. Every form of labor has some market-clearing wage, and 
wages rise or fall to equilibrate supply and demand for labor. But under socialism, where wages 
are either equal or approximately equal, the only way to allocate labor is by political command, 
dictating by fiat who is to be employed where. But a system of compulsory, involuntary 
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employment is hardly compatible with the aspirations of democratic socialism.14 
Therefore, John Jewkes observed in The New Ordeal by Planning (1968 [1948]) that 
“whatever the original intentions of the planners, compulsion of labour soon becomes inevitable. 
For how, otherwise can labour be got into the appropriate jobs?” (1968 [1948]:90). And further 
(1968 [1948]:191),
Labour is one of the resources which must be forced to fit into the [central 
economic planning] scheme as a whole. . . . [D]irection of labour is inevitably 
bound up with a plan courageously followed to its logical conclusion. . . . So long 
as the aim is a planned economy there can be no doubt of the trend of social 
pressures: it will be towards a progressive restriction in the choice of occupation.
Nor was Jewkes engaging in mere idle and unrealistic theorizing. In 1947, the British 
Labour government renewed its wartime requisitioning powers by enacting the Control of 
Engagements Order which empowered the government to conscript labor for essential industries 
(Farrant 2015, Caldwell in Hayek 2007 [1944]:47n19). Jewkes (1968 [1948]:191, 193) lamented 
that
the British planners, against all their best instincts, were driven to the restoration 
of conscription of labour in 1947. . . . By the autumn of that year it was the law of 
land that (with the exception of a small proportion of the working population) no 
man between the ages of 18 and 50 years and no woman between the ages of 18 
and 40 years could change his or her occupation at will. 
Referring to that same law, Hayek (2007 [1944]:47) noted that merely “six months later [after the 
war] the same government found itself in peacetime forced to put the conscription of labor back 
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on the statute book.”15 
Jewkes argued that this involuntary servitude was not a consequence of any despotic 
intent or moral depravity or abuse of power, but was dictated “by the logic of events” (1968 
[1948]:193) and by “the inexorable demands of the plan” (ibid.). Likewise, according to Hayek 
(2007 [1944]:47), “[t]here is no better illustration [than this regimentation of labor] of the 
manner in which the inherent logic of their policies drove an unwilling socialist government into 
the kind of coercion it disliked.” In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1994)'s Public Choice 
criticism of market socialism,16 the problem here with democratic socialism is not that the 
politicians will abuse their power or be insufficiently benevolent or lack proper incentives. There 
is no principle-agent problem here (cf. Caldwell 1997:1875ff.). No matter how benevolent the 
political officials are, and no matter their incentives, any thoroughgoing and successfully-
implemented democratic socialism, say Hayek and Jewkes, must be totalitarian. If anything, the 
more sincere and disinterested the politicians are, the more thoroughly they will strive to 
implement the socialist plan by regimenting labor, without any regard for their own self-interest. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that François-Noël (Gracchus) Babeuf, in his communistic 
scheme for France – sincerely intended to fulfill the democratic and libertarian aims of the 
French Revolution – proposed “to displace workers in accordance with national needs” (Talmon 
1960:239).17
Healthcare provides one interesting example of this labor problem. In another book, A 
Return to Free Market Economics?, Jewkes notes that socialized medicine cannot guarantee true 
equality of access to medical care – including an egalitarian physical distribution of doctors – 
unless the government is “prepared to deprive doctors of freedom to operate in the district of 
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their own choice” (1978:84; cf. pp. 67, 70).18 Of course, the government could pay doctors a 
premium to incentivize them to voluntarily relocate to less desirable districts, but this implies 
income inequality. Or the government could distribute health vouchers to its citizens, each worth 
an identical amount of money, so that everyone can afford the same number of dollars of 
healthcare. But then citizens with different medical conditions and living in different districts 
would obtain different levels of healthiness and care for the same number of dollars; once again, 
there would be inequality.19
Astoundingly, none other than the most famous advocate of democratic socialism 
(Makovi 2015a, 2016a) – George Orwell himself – seems to have realized these issues. In 
Orwell's final edition of “London Letters” in the Partisan Review (11:3, summer 1946), Orwell 
argued (to quote Newsinger 1999:139)
that in conditions of full employment if wages are evened out, workers will drift 
away from the more disagreeable jobs . . . Quite incredibly, he [Orwell] argued 
that socialists had to face up to the fact that “you had to make use of forced labour 
for the dirtier kinds of work.”
Not long before, in July 1945, Orwell had similarly stated in the Partisan Review that Britain 
“will be obliged to both coerce the miners” and that “post-war reconstruction . . . [would require] 
'direction' of labour over a long period” (quoted in Farrant 2015:176n43).20 
It is difficult to determine how democracy could successfully prevent socialism from 
turning tyrannical, if any form of egalitarian socialism necessarily requires compulsory labor. If 
central economic planning cannot work without conscription of labor, then democratic socialism 
amounts to letting the slave elect his slave-master without the freedom to leave the plantation. If 
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any economic plan is necessarily totalitarian, then democracy will do little to help. Democratic 
socialism must resort to conscription of labor not because power has been maliciously abused but 
because wages have been forced towards equality. Even the most kind-hearted and benevolent 
planner would have little choice.
2. Freedom of Occupation under Market Socialism
Strictly speaking, however, government ownership or regulation of the means of 
production does not require equality of wages. Oskar Lange could state“[f]reedom of choice of 
occupation [is] assumed” under socialism (1938:83) and that we can “assume that freedom of 
choice in consumption and freedom of choice of occupation are maintained” by socialism 
(1938:72) precisely because Lange accepted income inequality. Discussing the distribution of 
profits and interest to the citizens in the form of a social dividend, Lange (1938:83f.) states,
Freedom of choice of occupation assumed, the distribution of the social dividend 
may affect the amount of services of labor offered to different industries. If certain 
occupations received a larger social dividend than others, labor would be diverted 
into the occupations receiving a larger dividend. Therefore, the distribution of the 
social dividend must be such as not to interfere with the optimum distribution of 
labor services between the different industries and occupations. . . . Therefore, the 
social dividend must be distributed so as to have no influence whatsoever on the 
choice of occupation. The social dividend paid to an individual must be entirely 
independent of his choice of occupation.
Although Lange is discussing the distribution of firm dividends, not wages, his statement 
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implicitly agrees with Hayek and Jewkes that the wage or income in any given industry 
determines how many people will choose to be employed in that industry. Therefore, Lange 
specified that under market socialism, wages will be determined by essentially the same method 
they are in a free-market, with approximately the same kind of inequality (cf. Caldwell 
1997:1862). 
But it is hard to imagine how any socialist would be satisfied with such inequality. As 
Hayek (1978 [1976]:304) says in response to Lange, a regime implementing market socialism
could do nothing to secure that the remuneration the the market gave to each 
participant would correspond to what the government regarded as socially just. 
Yet to achieve such a so-called 'just' remuneration was, after all, the whole 
intended purpose of the socialist revolution!21
Let us not forget that the incomes of business executives and managers and the allocation of 
their labor are all regulated by the same economic principles as the incomes and allocation of all 
other kinds of labor. Managerial and executive labor must be allocated efficiently as well, and 
there is no reason why the market-clearing rate for their labor ought to be significantly different 
under socialism than under capitalism. But this clearly will not satisfy many socialists, who will 
insist on a more thoroughly implemented scheme of (approximate) equality of income. The 
recent reception of Piketty (2014 [2013])'s Capital in the Twenty-First Century should make it 
clear that Lange's endorsement of radical income inequality will not be shared by many 
socialists.
It is also important to note that Lange's statement that “The social dividend paid to an 
individual must be entirely independent of his choice of occupation” is not entirely accurate. This 
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implies that a per-capita egalitarian distribution of the social dividend – an exactly equal number 
of dollars per person – would be sufficient to avoid affecting labor incentives. But this is not true 
because incentives and values are always marginal. A $100 dividend given to someone who earns 
$100,000 is not the same as the same $100 dividend given to someone who earns only $50,000. 
Tthe value of an objectively constant thing will subjectively vary, depending on what it is being 
compared to. Whether a person chooses to take one job at one wage or another job at another 
wage will depend on the size of the social dividend. Suppose a person is earning $50,000 and 
they know that they can earn twice as much money by working twice as hard. They may find this 
worthwhile. But suppose the social dividend is $20,000 per year, independent of a person's 
occupation. Then the choice is not $50,000 versus $100,000, but instead, it is $70,000 versus 
$120,000. And now the person may not regard it worthwhile to work twice as hard to earn 
$120,000 instead of $70,000. Because value is marginal, an egalitarian distribution of the social 
dividend will affect labor incentives. Lange neglected the income and substitution effects of 
labor versus leisure. The social dividend must be distributed unequally in such a way that 
incentives will be the same as if it were never distributed at all. It is difficult – probably 
impossible – to know how to properly distribute the social dividend unequally in such a way as 
to leave incentives unaffected. The challenge of determining how to properly distribute the social 
dividend creates an entirely new problem which Lange's market socialism never addressed. 
Alternatively, Lange could specify an egalitarian distribution of the social dividend and then 
allow wages to vary until the combination of unequal wages plus egalitarian social dividend 
produced an equilibrium pattern of employment. The final income package combining unequal 
wages with equal social dividend would still have to be sufficiently non-egalitarian to efficiently 
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allocate labor. 
Assuming that the planned pattern of productive output is sacrosanct – and this implies a 
similarly planned pattern of employment – the social dividend cannot be distributed in such a 
way as to reduce inequality because this would influence the choice of occupation. Freedom of 
choice of occupation thus requires that the government abstain from interfering with inequality 
of income. Wages and incomes must be permitted to be radically unequal. If a specific pattern of 
production is aimed for, then the government must allow wages to freely vary in order to attract 
precisely the right amount and kinds of labor to each industry. Contrariwise, if the government 
settles upon a policy of income equality, then it cannot aim for any particular pattern of 
productive output or distribution of labor across industries.
Since Michael Harrington (1978:443f.) and David Schweickart (1992:11) – two 
advocates of democratic socialism or economic democracy – both approvingly cite Lange, it 
might be assumed that their schemes both presuppose freedom of choice of occupation – and 
therefore, inequality as well. But in fact, neither Harrington nor Schweickart understands Lange's 
system. Harrington (1978:443f.) approvingly cites Lange (1938) and yet he also declares 
(1978:445) that “The wage structure, then, would be infinitely more progressive than it is within 
capitalism.” Harrington (1978:446) adds that “differentials related to skill and output . . . would 
be tolerated, precisely as an incentive for individuals and enterprises to produce more 
efficiently,” but he is not aware that these differentials may have to be approximately as large as 
they already are under capitalism. He advocates (1978:446) “an egalitarian tax policy [that] 
would severely limit the differentials and' work toward a redistribution of income and wealth,” 
but he fails to understand that an egalitarian tax policy would completely negate the wage 
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differentials he had advocated just a moment earlier. It makes no sense to provide wage surpluses 
as rewards and then to turn right around and tax them away again. Then Harrington (1978:446) 
says “a part of the wage would be received collectively, as a social dividend from heightened 
productivity,” but this would entail precisely the same problems as it does for Lange, which we 
have shown. Like Harrington, Schweickart specifies that wage differentials will be restricted in 
order to limit income inequality (1992:20n7) even though this is incompatible with his reliance 
on Lange (1992:11).22 Harrington and Schweickart cannot have their cake and eat it too; they 
cannot have differential wages and egalitarian redistribution and a targeted pattern of 
consumption, production, and employment. One cannot dictate both prices and economic 
outcomes without resort to direct physical coercion. If the government fixes wages and taxes so 
as to achieve economic equality, then it cannot target a specifically patterned economic outcome. 
If the government seeks to achieve both equality and this predetermined productive output, this 
is possible only through the use of corvée and compulsory direction of employment.
In summary: for a socialist government to be authentically socialist – for it to consistently 
and completely plan the economy and maintain equality of wages – it must assign everyone to 
his occupation without any freedom of employment. Otherwise, the government cannot ensure 
the plan will be implemented. Either a democratic socialist government will insist on this 
assignment procedure and become tyrannical, or else it will abandon the assignment procedure 
and permit freedom of employment, preserving democratic values at the cost of abandoning 
socialism. A compromise is possible, but because socialism and individual autonomy are at 
opposite poles and inversely proportional, the one must be sacrificed to the identical degree to 
which the other is not. It is no great consolation to the socialist to be told that any compromise 
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between socialism and freedom is an inversely proportioned one, with exactly as much socialism 
as there is not freedom, and vice versa. One solution is, of course, to allow income inequality so 
that labor is allocated by wage differentials, but this would defeat the egalitarian aims of 
socialism.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY WELFARE STATE
The question remains, however, whether any of this is relevant to the modern welfare 
state. As we saw, Caldwell (in Hayek 2007 [1944]:30f., 2011) states that Hayek's Road to 
Serfdom does not apply to the welfare state. But Farrant and McPhail (2009:12, 15) note that 
years after he wrote the Road to Serfdom, Hayek (1978 [1976]:300) stated that his argument in 
that book did apply modern welfare state. Farrant and McPhail (2009) argue that because the 
modern welfare state is not totalitarian and because The Road to Serfdom's thesis does apply to 
the welfare state (by Hayek's own admission), therefore, it follows that the thesis of The Road to 
Serfdom must be wrong. The syllogism is logically valid.
But while that deduction is valid (i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises), it is not 
sound (i.e. accurate) because there are missing premises. We must examine what Hayek 
specifically said about the welfare state. Hayek's earlier and later works must not be conflated, 
and their respective historical and institutional contexts must be considered (Caldwell 2011).
The first thing to recall is the central role which Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law 
plays in The Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]:112-123). We should therefore expect Hayek's 
criticism of the welfare state to reflect his theory of the rule-of-law. Indeed, in The Constitution 
of Liberty (2011 [1960]:148-165) and again in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1977:62-106), he 
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argued that redistribution of wealth to achieve social justice violates the rule-of-law. Treating 
people equally will result in unequal outcomes and achieving equal outcomes requires treating 
people unequally (2011 [1960]:150; 1966:170; 1977:82). Hayek interpreted the demand for 
“social justice” – i.e. fair incomes – as appropriate only for an “organization” with unitary ends, 
deliberately shaped by a single human will, but inappropriate for a “catallaxy” (market 
economy), a legal order based on formal, purpose-independent rules which enable individuals to 
pursue their own ends (1966:170-172; 1977:69, 75, 85, 96f., 102f.). Hayek's distinction between 
“catallaxy” and “organization” is similar to that which Oakeshott drew between a civic 
association and an enterprise association, and Hayek believed that the rule-of-law could survive 
only in a civic association (cf. Capaldi and Lloyd 2011: xxiii). Only if society per se has some 
teleological end is it meaningful to declare that certain end-state outcomes are fair or unfair. By 
contrast, if society is understood to be a spontaneous order where individuals are free to 
separately pursue their own ends, then it is only the rules which can be fair or unfair, not the 
outcomes. There is no set of general, abstract, procedural rules of justice whose execution will 
achieve an end-state satisfying social justice (1977:85f.). Replacing commutative with 
distributive justice means displacing private law by public law (1977:87). Achieving a given end-
state requires a discretionary authority to give specific orders to individual people. Transforming 
society from a civic association, a spontaneous order governed by purpose-independent rules, 
into an organization or enterprise association governed by a single comprehensive, overriding 
will, is totalitarian in the literal sense (1977:104; cf. ibid. 83, 99, 180n2). Thus, Hayek 
understood the end-state conception of social justice to be contrary to the rule-of-law. Similarly, 
Hayek (1966:175) rejected the progressive income tax as discriminatory and too individually 
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specific to satisfy the rule-of-law. Therefore, Hayek would dispute Farrant and McPhail (2009)'s 
assertion that the modern welfare state is not totalitarian. If redistribution of wealth is itself a 
violation of the rule-of-law, then the modern welfare state must be totalitarian. Of course, one 
may dispute Hayek's assertion that redistribution is inconsistent with the rule-of-law. But this 
means disputing subjective, normative ethics, and so Farrant and McPhail (2009)'s argument 
against Hayek becomes less damaging.
Moreover, although Hayek (1966) does not say so explicitly, one gets the impression that 
his fear was that once one or two measures of “social justice” are enacted, violating the rule-of-
law, there will be no intellectually consistent way to reject any other inroads on the rule-of-law. 
As Farrant and McPhail (2009:8n11) themselves note, sometimes what Hayek said was not that 
the welfare state itself would lead to totalitarian socialism, but rather, that the ideas underlying 
the welfare state would eventually lead to totalitarianism. It is not that the progressive income tax 
will by itself alone lead us down the road to serfdom. Instead, once one violation of the rule-of-
law is granted – no matter how innocuous in isolation – there will no reason not to grant 
countless others. Hayek criticized one pinprick because he knew that once the principle was 
granted that a person may prick another with moral impunity, there was the possibility of death 
by a million pinpricks. If the slippery slope has been avoided, it may be precisely thanks to 
Hayek's warning.
But Hayek went further than attributing to the welfare state the abandonment of the rule-
of-law. In The Constitution of Liberty (2011 [1960]) and in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1977), 
Hayek added that the redistribution of wealth would create specific consequences in labor 
markets which would necessitate totalitarian inroads, similar to what we demonstrated in the 
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previous section on labor economics. Hayek predicted that people would object to inequalities of 
income that did not correspond to moral desert or merit (Hayek 2011 [1960]:156). Pursuing 
“social justice,” the welfare state must rely on price-controls to fix the remuneration of labor, in 
order to ensure that every form of labor receives its “fair” due (Hayek 1978 [1976]:300f.). But, 
he said, this is inconsistent with freedom of occupation: “distributive justice is irreconcilable 
with freedom in the choice of one's activities” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:156n12). Once incomes are 
fixed, not according to the economic value of the labor but according to merit and desert, labor 
will no longer be efficiently allocated and employees will have no idea where they ought to go. 
“If the remuneration did not correspond to the value that the product of a man's efforts has for his 
fellows, he would have no basis for deciding whether the pursuit of a given object is worth the 
effort and risk. He would necessarily have to be told what to do” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:159f.).23 
And again (1977:82):
a government aiming to secure for its citizens equal material positions  . . . would 
have to undertake to tell people what to do. Once the rewards the individual can 
expect are no longer an appropriate indication of how to direct their efforts to 
where they are most needed, because these rewards correspond not to the value 
which their services have for their fellows, but to the moral merit or desert the 
persons are deemed to have earned, they lose the guiding function they have in 
the market order and would have to be replaced by the commands of the directing 
authority.
Hayek continued (1977:84), “Nor could anyone who is assured remuneration according to some 
principle which is accepted as constituting 'social justice' be allowed to decide what he is to do” 
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because remuneration would be according to moral desert instead of economic value. Therefore, 
Hayek (1977:92) concluded, income inequality 
is a necessary concomitant of any system in which remuneration is based on the 
values the services have to the user and not on an assessment of merit earned. It 
must therefore prevail in any social order in which the individual is free to choose 
whatever occupation he can find and is not assigned to one by authority.
For example, suppose we decide that janitors and electrical engineers are equally 
deserving of the same income. Once this parity is established – as we shall see, it makes little 
difference whether by price-controls or by taxation and subsidy – the law of price-controls will 
operate. The market-clearing wages of electrical engineers are greater than the market-clearing 
wages of janitors, and once their wages are compulsorily equated, there will be a relative surplus 
of janitors and a relative shortage of electrical engineers. Whether this implies manifest shortages 
and surpluses, or whether the suboptimal misallocation is concealed, depends on the specific 
interventions. A minimum wage will create an unemployable surplus. But while a subsidy will 
create an over-supply, the over-supply will not be an unemployable surplus. Furthermore, 
unemployment created by a price floor can be concealed by a government price-support, i.e. a 
promise to provide government jobs to all those who cannot find private employment at the 
stipulated wages. But whether the over- and under-supplies are concealed or manifest, the 
inefficient misallocation is real. Unless chaos and inefficiency are tolerated, the labor of janitors 
and electrical engineers must be compulsorily allocated to ensure that precisely the right number 
are employed. Thus, “every such attempt at deliberate control of some remunerations is bound to 
create further demand for new controls” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:164). One intervention begets 
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another, just as Mises (1996 [1929], 1998) predicted.
In a 1976 lecture, Hayek (1978 [1976]) repeated several of these points. Speaking about 
the welfare state, Hayek (1978 [1976]:300) “greatly doubt[ed] their capacity to combine their 
aim of a through government redistribution of wealth with the preservation, in the long run, of a 
modicum of personal freedom.” Hayek claimed that to achieve its goals, the welfare state must 
“preserve functioning markets [in the] . . . factors of production . . . and also somehow . . . to 
influence at least the prices of labour . . . To satisfy both of these requirements in full is 
impossible.” (1978 [1976]:300). Echoing Mises's theory of intervention (Mises 1996 [1929], 
1998), Hayek (1978 [1976]:300) continued, “Though the process may be gradual, a government 
which begins to control prices to secure popular conceptions of justice is bound to be driven step 
by step towards the control of all prices; and, since this must destroy the functioning of the 
market, to a central direction of the economy.” In this lecture, Hayek also repeated the argument 
that with the abolition of differential wages must come the compulsory direction of labor (Hayek 
1978 [1976]:307):
the individual can be left free to choose the directions of his efforts only if 
rewards fluctuate with the value of the services he can contribute to the society's 
common pool of resources. If his income is politically determined, he loses not 
merely the incentive but also the possibility of deciding what he ought to do in the 
general interest. And if he cannot know himself what he must do to make his 
services valuable to his fellows, he must be commanded to do what is required.
If the salaries of janitors and of electrical engineers are made equal, then no individual has any 
way of knowing whether he will serve the common good better by being one or the other. He 
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loses access to the data which would inform him of society's needs as well as the incentive to act 
on any such information. Therefore, the government must compel him to choose that occupation 
where labor is more relatively scarce.
It is important to notice that taxation of incomes is a form of price-control on labor as 
well. If the natural market rate for a given type of labor is $100,000, then there is not much 
difference between taxing that labor to the amount of $30,000 versus fixing that labor at $70,000 
and leaving it un-taxed. The over- and under-supply may be concealed or manifest, but they exist 
either way. The reason why progressive income taxes have not produced totalitarian outcomes, 
however, is because contemporary welfare states have not attempted to ensure that any particular 
kind of labor is done with any particular frequency or with any particular productive output. In 
other words, contemporary governments are content to manipulate the returns to different kinds 
of labor and then allow the market to decide how many people will occupy themselves in those 
various labors and how much output they will produce. They have manipulated prices but 
tolerated the market consequences of those manipulations (cf. Mises 1981 [1922]:446). 
Again, it is important to keep in mind Röpke's (1992 [1942]:260; cf. 1987 [1951]:7f.) 
distinction between interventions which are “compatible” with the price system and those which 
are not (cf. Ikeda 2015:409, 414). Referring to J. S. Mill, Hayek spoke of “Mill's Muddle,” the 
belief that production and distribution could be disconnected from one another (Ebeling 
1977:11). In fact, production is distribution; the same prices simultaneously incentivize and 
remunerate production, and to alter distribution is therefore to alter production. But 
contemporary welfare states have not attempted to direct distribution in one direction and 
production in the other. Instead, they have intervened in one and let the other adjust itself 
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accordingly. If taxing one form of labor and subsidizing another has resulted in a shift in 
productive output and employment from one industry to another, welfare states have not 
generally attempted to counteract this tendency by compulsory redirection of labor. Welfare 
states have thus eschewed any attempts to plan – which is why there are no obviously totalitarian 
consequences. 
But suppose the governments were to take J. S. Mill seriously, and really attempt to 
disconnect production and distribution in order to achieve distributive or social justice. Suppose 
governments were to tax a given kind of labor and simultaneously insist that the employment and 
output in the taxed industry be precisely the same as it was before the tax was implemented. Or 
suppose these governments were to tax a given kind of labor and also demand that employment 
and output in the corresponding industry satisfy some arbitrarily-determined figure – say, that 
there must be such-and-such a number of coal miners and such-and-such an output of coal – 
regardless of prices. In other words, suppose that “fair” wage controls were imposed to ensure 
“social justice” at the same time that economic planning were attempted. This could not be 
accomplished without compulsion and forcible assignment of employment against the wills of 
those employed. No government may arbitrarily determine incomes according to egalitarian 
standards of “fairness” – whether by setting a tax or by fixing a wage-rate – and simultaneously 
fix a level of employment and output in the corresponding industry, without resort to corvée. 
By contrast, modern welfare states have chosen to relatively equalize wages but permit 
production and employment to vary themselves, not according to any plan. No welfare state 
today fixes the prices of labor in the way which Hayek feared they would. But this does not 
refute Hayek's argument that if welfare states were to fix wages – whether by redistribution or by 
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price-control – and to insist on a specific pattern of output and employment regardless of prices – 
then we would wind up traveling along the road to serfdom. The fact that welfare states today 
have wisely eschewed price-controls does not refute Hayek's prediction that such controls would 
carry totalitarian consequences were they to be implemented. Therefore, Farrant and McPhail 
(2009) are incorrect to assert that the thesis of The Road to Serfdom has been falsified by the 
non-totalitarian nature of contemporary welfare states. If Hayek's prediction was wrong, it is 
largely because his warning was heeded (cf. Caldwell 1997:1868f., Witt 1992).24 25
IV. CONCLUSION
Several scholars have noted the impossibility of distinguishing economic and political 
freedoms (Lawson and Clark 2010; Friedman 1962; Boettke 1995:10f.; Rothbard 1977:25).26 
Milton Friedman (1962:16-18) chose to illustrate this principle using the freedom of speech. He 
famously argued that there can be no freedom of the press where the government owns the 
printing presses (cf. Rothbard 1977:26, Mises 1981 [1922]:538). But F. A. Hayek (2007 [1944], 
2011 [1960]) and John Jewkes (1968 [1948]) chose instead to illustrate the inseparability 
principle using labor economics, demonstrating the necessity of compulsorily labor under 
socialism. Perhaps they chose this example because the problem is so much more stark and 
forbidding. Most citizens do not publish newspaper editorials very often, so the denial of the 
freedom of speech may not mean much for them. But there is no citizen who would not be 
terrified by the prospect of slavery, the paradigmatic denial of individual freedom. And yet 
socialism cannot operate without literal slavery – compulsory labor. Fittingly, Hayek's work was 
titled, The Road to Serfdom. If socialism requires regimenting labor, what hope for any other 
kind of freedom can there be? According to Hayek and Jewkes, egalitarian socialism necessitates 
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the abolition or severe restriction of differential wages, making it impossible to allocate labor 
according to any economic plan without resorting to compulsion and regimentation. Farrant and 
McPhail (2009) claim Hayek's thesis must be wrong because Hayek said the lesson of The Road 
to Serfdom applies to the welfare state as well, which is not totalitarian. But Hayek pointed out 
two reasons why his argument is applicable even to the welfare state: first, redistribution of 
wealth violates the rule-of-law because it necessitates treating people unequally; and second, 
because if welfare states had attempted to ensure that all incomes are “fair” and accord with 
“social justice,” then welfare states would have had to resort to compulsory labor allocation, 
assuming these welfare states wished to ensure that productive output did not suffer. The fact that 
welfare states have not attempted this does not refute Hayek's claim that the attempt would have 
been totalitarian.
Hayek's argument in The Road to Serfdom is a contingent one: whether a given 
government intervention will lead us down the road to serfdom depends on precisely whether 
and how that intervention will force people to live their lives differently than they otherwise 
would have. Moreover, it depends on how compatible a given intervention is with the 
functioning of the price system (Röpke 1992 [1942]:260, 1987 [1951]:7f.; Ikeda 2015:409, 414) 
– meaning, whether consumption, production, and employment are free to adjust themselves to 
whatever prices turn out to be (Mises 1981 [1922]:446), or whether the government demands a 
given pattern of consumption, production, and employment irrespective of prices. Not every 
government intervention is therefore equally likely to reduce us to slavery. A tax which allows 
production, employment, and consumption to adjust themselves to the new pattern of prices will 
not interfere with human freedom to the same extent as a regulation which simultaneously fixes a 
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tax upon a resource or type of labor and nevertheless insists on given level of productive output. 
Hayek's argument is contingent. The historical and institutional contexts in which he wrote must 
be considered and his works must not be conflated with one another (Caldwell 2011). A common 
thread runs through all his works, and this claim has stood the test of time: political and 
economic freedom hang together (Lawson and Clark 2010). If today, we find that we have not 
traveled down the road to serfdom, it is largely because Hayek's warning was heeded. Hayek can 
hardly be blamed for this.
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